Introduction In a few weeks, Madagascar will approach the first anniversary of the uprising led by Generation Z. In autumn 2025, protests over water and electricity cuts had triggered a major political crisis. The departure of Andry Rajoelina and the intervention of part of the military had paved the way for Colonel Michaël Randrianirina, who became president of the Refoundation. The mobilization had reversed the balance of power. However, it had resolved neither the question of institutions to be rebuilt nor that of limits to be imposed on the new leaders. Nearly a year after this rupture, one question deserves to guide analysis: is the government preparing the conditions for its replacement or for its prolongation? Answering requires examining decisions, resources mobilized, and constraints accepted. Proclaimed intentions matter, but they are insufficient to define a trajectory. A Flexible Calendar Under Constitutional Control Article 53 of the Constitution provides for a presidential election between thirty and sixty days after the declaration of vacancy. It limits interim prerogatives, notably the dissolution of the National Assembly and constitutional revision. But reading the situation based solely on this deadline would be incomplete: the High Constitutional Court clarified its application in its decision No. 13-HCC/D3 of November 6, 2025. Its article 5 makes postponement of the election possible under Court control. The reasons require an objective assessment of political, security, financial, and technical conditions allowing a free, transparent election accepted by all. No new deadline or maximum extension period is set. This decision opens the possibility of exceeding sixty days. However, it does not grant the president power to extend the electoral period without control. The issue shifts: how to establish that additional time prepares elections? The decision maintains institutional mandates according to the Constitution or law; it does not grant competence to reshape them. One must distinguish calendar flexibility from expansion of powers. Prolongation alone is insufficient to establish an exit from the constitutional framework. The political risk lies in a provisional period without fixed term, whose justifications and effects on presidential consolidation must be controlled. What Our Indicator Measures Diapason's Power Perpetuation Index, or IPP, helps track this installation. It brings together several dimensions: calendar control, institutional functioning, personalization of power, administrative control, legitimation, opposition, mobilization, and external environment. Its value lies in examining together facts that, taken separately, may seem secondary. The September 10 edition maintains the score at 62.6%, as on August 22. This figure is neither a popularity rating, nor a probability of electoral victory, nor a percentage of illegality. It summarizes observations retained in a framework for reading power consolidation. It thus clarifies certain manifestations of interim political expansion, without replacing legal analysis. Its stability also calls for simple explanation. The new facts recorded did not modify the levels already assigned to the eight dimensions. An indicator built by stages can maintain the same score while new decisions extend an existing dynamic. One must therefore read the figure with accompanying events. An unchanged value signifies neither national immobility nor trajectory harmlessness. Calendar Becomes a Power Issue National consultation constitutes a first test. The calendar presented in late August provides for starting consultations in fokontany on September 14, then their progression to higher levels. The national phase is announced between March and May 2027. The process should allow citizens to contribute to the country's future directions. This ambition deserves to be taken seriously. An open consultation can identify overlooked needs and broaden participation. But its value will depend on very concrete questions: who will be able to participate, how will proposals be selected, who will write the synthesis, and how will disagreements be reported? Gathering voices does not yet guarantee they will influence decisions. The calendar raises another difficulty. Conclusions expected in spring 2027 leave little time to translate them into proposals, allow their discussion, and prepare the first electoral deadline envisioned between May and July. This tension, noted by the press, does not equate to an official postponement. However, it constitutes a specific point of vigilance. Each additional delay...